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RIVALS’ REACTIONS TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Abstract 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) research has principally focused on attributes of the acquiring 
firm and post-acquisition outcomes. To extend our knowledge, we focus on external factors, in 
particular rival responses, and explore when and how rivals respond to their competitor’s 
acquisitions. Leveraging the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework, we predict and 
find evidence that a rival’s dependence on markets in common with the acquirer, resourse 
similarity between rival and acquirer, and a rival’s organizational slack increase the volume and 
in some cases also the complexity of a rival’s competitive actions following an acquisition. 
Further, the type of acquisition positively moderates some of these relationships. The results 
extend our understanding of the influence of M&As on competitive dynamics in the marketplace. 
 
Keywords:  Mergers and Acquisitions, Competitive Dynamics, Competitive Action Repertoire, 
Competitive Response, Content Analysis 
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Introduction 
Prevailing theory and conventional wisdom suggest that firms engage in acquisitions for various 
reasons, including diversifying into new market domains, capturing and leveraging synergistic 
resource exchanges between merging firms, and overcoming barriers to entry, among others (Hitt 
et al., 2001; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Importantly, acquisitions also influence an industry’s 
competitive dynamics; Kim and Singal (1993) and Chatterjee (1986) found that acquisitions can 
reduce competitive rivalry, lead to collusion among competitors, and engender accommodation 
of the merging firms by their rivals, all creating a competitive context favorable to the acquirer. 
Yet, empirical research has found that returns to acquisitions are often negative (e.g., Jensen and 
Ruback, 1983; King et al., 2004) and identified various internal costs and challenges in the 
acquisition process for the causes of weak merger performance. Explanations for poor returns 
include takeover premiums paid to the target firm’s shareholders, unanticipated post-acquisition 
integration costs, managers’ pursuit of personal interests via acquisition, etc. (Hitt et al., 1990; 
Sirower, 1997). Further, there is evidence that rivals may act aggressively in the pre-merger 
phase, for instance, by bidding on a target to elevate its price, which reduces the returns to an 
acquisition (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Moreover, Ghemawat and Ghadar (2000) found 
that rivals engage in bold strategic moves to exploit the distraction of acquirer management 
during the merger process. 
The focus on the internal costs and rival behavior prior to and during an acquisition significantly 
limit our understanding of the disappointing outcomes (King et al., 2004). However, recent 
research on competitive dynamics and anecdotal evidence suggest the importance of the 
external, post-acquisition competitive context. Extant research suggests acquirers may gain 
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advantages from acquisitions that negatively impact their rivals. We contend that some of the 
acquirer’s rivals do not accommodate the acquisition or collude with the acquirer, as previous 
work has shown. Instead, certain rivals view M&As as stimulating hostility and competitive 
disruption, leading to a different competitive landscape post merger that weakens the acquirer’s 
post-acquisition performance. Additionally, Markman and colleagues (2009) suggest that 
acquisitions contribute to product market rivalry and also to factor market rivalry that can 
exacerbate and intensify product market rivalry. 
Therefore, an important reason M&As often fail to meet expectations is the inability of the 
acquiring firm to account for the effects of rivals’ aggressive competitive responses following 
the acquisition (Haleblian et al., 2009). As a result, examination of potentially aggressive—rather 
than accommodating—responses to acquisitions is critical to better understand post-acquisition 
outcomes. Moreover, understanding the drivers of aggressive responses is essential to predict the 
potential success (or lack thereof) of M&As. The recent evidence on aggressive reactions by 
rivals suggests that examining the competitive context of M&A and the characteristics of the 
firms involved can advance our understanding of this important phenomenon. Prior research on 
competitive behaviors such as rivals aggressive or accommodating actions after an acquisition, 
suggest the importance of identifying the organizational and competitive characteristics that 
prompt rival responses. Thus, our research question is: Following an acquisition, which 
organizational and competitive conditions prompt rivals to compete more aggressively? We 
build on the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework used in competitive dynamics 
research to predict when and how rivals respond (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). 
Our study makes two concomitant contributions. Answering the call for new theory to explain 
the consequences of M&As (Haleblian et al., 2009; King et al., 2004), we offer an alternative, 
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competition-centric explanation for the generally weak performance of acquisitions. This cause 
of the weak performance is external to the deal and to the merging firms, specifically, 
competitive pressures engendered by the acquisition. Our study challenges previous work 
suggesting that rivals tend to accommodate M&As. Second, by exploring the link between 
corporate-level decisions (M&A) and competitive behavior (action repertoires), our study 
demonstrates the generalizability of recent research on product and factor market rivalry (Chen 
et al., 2007; Markman et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2001). Thus, it extends competitive dynamics 
into the domain of corporate strategy and its consequences. Our findings help to identify specific 
rival conditions—i.e., dependence on markets in common with the acquirer, rival slack, and 
resource similarity between rival and acquirer—that motivate and enable rivals to respond 
aggressively to their competitors’ acquisitions. 
A competition-centric view of M&A activity 
Prior research examined the potential for acquisitions to reduce rivalry by decreasing the number 
of competitors, thus increasing market power, and the potential to produce gains from economies 
of scope (Clougherty and Duso, 2011).  Alternatively, Chatterjee (1986) suggested that some 
acquisitions produce ‘collusive synergy’—i.e., the ability of the acquirer to increase prices 
because of collusion among the industry participants. Similarly, Kim and Singal (1993) found 
that merging two rival airlines led to higher prices thereafter. These studies strongly suggest the 
exploitation of market power and tacit collusion between rivals associated with mergers. 
Research on corporate strategy has traditionally conceptualized M&As based on a narrow cost-
benefit analysis—related to market power, synergies, etc. Related studies largely disregarded 
rivals’ responses in evaluating the outcomes of acquisitions. Others found that rivals concede 
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exploitation of merger gains to the acquirer (e.g., Kim and Singal, 1993). Such a concession may 
take the form of increasing prices, reducing capacity, leaving markets, etc. More recently, 
Clougherty and Duso (2011) found that approximately one quarter of the large-scale, horizontal 
acquisitions (and rivals of the acquirers and targets) produced collusive synergies. Yet, the extant 
research does not explicitly and directly account for the broader competitive context; namely, the 
possibility of aggressive competitive responses by rivals that counteract some or all of the 
potential benefits of M&A to the acquirer. Similar concerns regarding rival reactions to their 
competitors’ strategic moves have recently been suggested for research on strategic alliances 
(Park and Zhou, 2005) and factor markets (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Markman et al., 2009).  
Competitive dynamics research suggests that the success of a firm’s actions depends on the 
number and range of rivals’ reactions. Simon (2005) found that rivals, in general, do not respond 
uniformly—either via accommodation or retaliation—to new entries into their market. Owing to 
a variety of organizational and competitive factors, some rival-incumbents are strongly 
motivated to respond aggressively by carrying out a wide range of competitive actions—price 
cuts, product improvements, advertising campaigns, new products, etc. (Geroski, 1995)—while 
others are less motivated to respond aggressively. Further, the intensity and form of the firm’s 
competitive responses to a rival’s actions are contingent on a number of important organizational 
and competitive conditions (cf., Smith et al., 2001). For instance, Silverman and Baum (2002) 
found that competitive intensity in response to the formation of an alliance by a rival depends on 
the specific nature of the alliance: horizontal, upstream, or downstream.  
Upon completing an acquisition, the acquirer may realize an improvement in its competitive 
position or in its competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001). These potential benefits may signal 
that the acquirer has enhanced its capability to compete (Chen et al., 2007), thereby leading 
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rivals to view the acquisition as a competitive threat (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2014). Indeed, one 
study found that nearly 50 percent of rivals of acquirers lose market value because of the 
acquisition (Clougherty and Duso, 2011).1 While price changes subsequent to an acquisition are 
easily observable and can be matched by rivals, the full range of an acquisition’s outcomes are 
harder for rivals to assess. Concerned with differential gains and losses relative to the acquiring 
firm, rivals are likely motivated to respond to an acquisition with aggressive competitive action 
in order to defend their positions in product and/or factor markets and also to minimize or 
neutralize the potential advantages gained by the acquirer (Capron and Chatain, 2008). 
The business press highlights numerous examples of aggressive competitive responses carried 
out by an acquirer’s rivals. For instance, when Gillette acquired Duracell in 1996, top managers 
expected the deal to support earnings growth of the merged firms for several years into the 
future. Based on Gillette’s resources and market strength, management claimed that the 
combined firms would develop and market a successful premium-priced battery. Yet, rivals 
Rayovac and Energizer attacked with price cuts and special promotions. As a result of aggressive 
responses by rivals to the acquisition, Duracell lost overall market share and operating margins 
declined by one third (Business Week Online, 2000). 
These considerations strongly suggest that a merger can increase competitive pressures and elicit 
aggressive competitive responses by rivals of the merging firms. Yet, M&A research has not 
fully explored the drivers of rivals’ responses. Drawing from core ideas in competitive dynamics, 
we argue that post-acquisition competitive behavior is derivative of relevant and relative 
characteristics of competing firms in the industry. 
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Sources of competitive tension and observed competitive aggressiveness 
Scholars in competitive dynamics have developed theory and empirical methods focused on firm 
strategy as a competitive action, defined broadly as observable, externally-directed, market-
based competitive moves taken with the intent to improve a firm’s relative competitive position 
(Grimm et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2001). Early research in this stream examined the action-
response dyads (e.g., Chen, et al., 1992; Smith et al., 1991), whereby the characteristics of a 
singular competitive action are important predictors of a rival’s singular competitive response.2 
In ongoing head-to-head competitive interaction, however, firms carry out an endless series of 
competitive moves and countermoves—e.g., price cutting, introducing new products, marketing 
campaigns, capacity expansions, etc.—to keep rivals off balance, defend market share, and 
achieve/sustain superior performance (D’Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973; Smith et al., 2001). In this 
vein, research has examined a variety of antecedents and consequences of the entire set of 
competitive actions completed in a given period of time, the competitive action repertoire (e.g., 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Miller and Chen, 1994; 1996). Our study, in effect, is the first to tap into both 
the action-response and action repertoire levels of aggregation by examining how one firm’s 
singular corporate-level competitive action (an acquisition) influences two fundamental 
attributes of a rival’s competitive strategy: Action repertoire volume (how many actions the rival 
carries out) and action repertoire complexity (the extent to which the rival’s set of actions consists 
of a range of different types of actions). 
Central to competitive dynamics is the conceptualization and measurement of competitive 
aggressiveness. Drawing from Austrian economics, Hypercompetition theory, and corporate 
entrepreneurship research (Covin and Slevin, 1991; D’Aveni, 1994; Kirzner, 1973), competitive 
aggressiveness is defined as the propensity for firms to directly challenge rivals by carrying out a 
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sustained and diverse series of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lee, 2002; Ferrier 
et al., 1999). Beyond the number of competitive actions, the diversity of such actions is 
important because firms often respond uniquely to the particular character of the initial action 
(Chen and Miller, 2012). For instance, cost leaders may be more responsive to price cuts than 
quality leaders. We thus explore the conditions—i.e., rival and acquirer firm characteristics—
under which an acquisition made by a firm increases the competitive tension and triggers an 
aggressive competitive response among rivals in a given industry.3  
The emergent theoretical framework within competitive dynamics pinpoints three implicit 
drivers of aggressive competitive behavior—the awareness of rivals, the motivation to carry out 
competitive actions against one another, and the capability to carry out such actions—known as 
the AMC framework (Chen, 1996; Chen et al., 2007). Taken together, elements of the AMC 
framework manifest the competitive tension between rivals, or ‘…the strain between a focal firm 
and a given rival that is likely to result in the firm taking action against the rival’ (Chen et al., 
2007, p. 101). In our study, an acquisition carried out by the initiating firm is viewed as a 
specific, observable, competitive action that often changes the competitive equilibrium between 
firms in the market thereby transforming the static competitive ‘tension’ between the acquirer 
and its rivals into a dynamic, sustained, and potentially aggressive ‘interaction.’  
A rival’s awareness of its interdependence with other firms is conditioned by the dependence of 
the rival on markets common with these firms and on the similarity of the rival’s resources to the 
firms (Chen, 1996). Market dependence refers to the proportion of revenues or profits a firm 
derives from a particular product market; the larger the proportion, the higher the market 
dependence. Resource similarity is the extent to which two firms have comparable resource 
endowments in type and amount. Given high market dependence, rivals are keenly aware of one 
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another and their actions. Also, when market dependence is high, rivals are more likely to 
recognize the need to defend their market position from competitors whose actions, such as an 
acquisition, may threaten this position (Smith et al., 2001). Resource similarity makes rivals 
more aware of the potential consequences of strategic actions taken by their competitors and 
increases competitive tension (Chen et al., 2007). 
Market dependence and resource similarity among competitors may also motivate them to 
respond to competitive actions of their rivals (Chen, 1996). When firms depend on specific 
markets, they may see the need to defend their market position if it is threatened by a 
competitor’s competitive actions. Firms with similar resources have similar strengths and 
weaknesses, are likely to pursue similar strategies, and believe that they have the capability to 
compete on an equal footing (Chen et al., 2007; Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Harrison et al., 1991). 
An acquisition as a competitive action, in particular acquisition, may shift the relative resource 
balance between two firms and weaken the position of the rival relative to the acquirer because it 
often provides access to scarce strategic factors providing a greater opportunity to secure an 
advantage (Markman et al., 2009). Consequently, resource similarity, similar to market 
dependence, can motivate aggressive rival responses to an acquisition. 
The capability of a firm to respond to a competitor’s actions depends on the firm’s resources, 
such as financial and human capital (Chen, 1996). Organizational slack is a ‘cushion of 
resources’ that allows an organization to more quickly and effectively adapt to external changes 
and modify its strategy relative to firms with fewer resources (Haleblian et al., 2012; Wan and 
Yiu, 2009). Slack resources can facilitate or enable a variety of strategic behaviors, such as being 
an early actor in a merger wave (Haleblian et al., 2012), initiating strategic change (Bourgeois, 
1981), and carrying out a large number of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001). A competitor’s 
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acquisition can change competitive conditions, and slack allows firms not only to act in order to 
exploit specific opportunities but also to react to threats in the competitive environment.  
Furthermore, an acquisition represents a unique type of competitive action within an industry, 
namely a horizontal acquisition, a diversifying move across industries, a vertical acquisition, or 
an unrelated acquisition.4 Because related acquisitions are more disruptive to the focal industry 
than other acquisition types, essentially merging two competitors into a larger one, rivals are 
likely to be more aware of the acquisition’s implications and potentially more motivated to 
respond. In particular a horizontal acquisition may pose a particular threat to some (or many) 
rivals, similar to horizontal alliances (Silverman and Baum, 2002). Though a horizontal 
acquisition reduces the number of rivals in an industry, it also combines the strengths of two 
competitors, reducing the relative value of the strengths held by the rival(s). Such an attack via 
horizontal acquisition can motivate a rival to respond aggressively, especially if it depends 
highly on this market and the resource balance across rivals in the industry is threatened. Our full 
theoretical model is depicted in Figure 1. These relationships have heretofore not been examined 
in depth in the M&A or competitive dynamics research. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Hypotheses 
Market dependence as awareness-enhancing and aggressiveness-motivating 
The motivation to respond to an acquisition may hinge on the extent to which the rival is 
dependent on the acquirer’s primary markets (Chen, 1996). Dependence on the same product 
market gives the rival knowledge of the potential benefits associated with the acquisition. For 
instance, the acquisition may produce greater market power for the merging firms or provide the 
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capability to create innovations potentially valuable to customers in the market. Rivals with high 
dependence on a certain market are likely to have more knowledge about these markets than 
rivals with lower dependence, for example, because of greater investments in monitoring those 
markets. Accordingly, this knowledge makes the rival more aware of the potential outcomes of 
the acquisition because the rival can better anticipate customer benefits and reactions to the 
acquisition. Further, market knowledge may allow the rival to target its responses specifically at 
the resource advantages the acquirer will accrue from the acquisition. The heightened potential to 
reduce the acquirer’s gains—and to minimize the rival’s losses—from the acquisition can 
motivate a rival to react aggressively (Capron and Chatain, 2008; Yu and Cannella, 2007). 
Likewise, the rival’s knowledge of a particular industry and its experience in successfully 
overcoming competitive challenges, such as a merger, may additionally motivate targeted 
competitive responses that efficiently use the rivals’ resources. 
Understanding the effects of the acquisition on customers and markets more clearly also reduces 
the uncertainty involved with an aggressive response. The higher the expected gains from the 
acquisition, for instance an improved ability to serve customers, the stronger the potential 
reaction of the acquirer to aggressive rival behavior intended to reduce these gains. As the rival 
can more effectively anticipate the consequences of its aggressive behavior, uncertainty is 
reduced, incentivizing aggressive action over taking a defensive position. 
Furthermore, if a rival is highly dependent on the market, it may operate only in one or few 
markets. Rivals with low market dependence must also operate in other markets but can 
potentially compete with the merging firms in several markets. Gimeno (1999) found that 
multimarket competition reduces rivalry as firms recognize that aggressive competitor actions 
and responses in one market can have detrimental consequences in the other markets in which 
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they compete. Yet, higher market dependence suggests that the rival is less likely to be engaged 
in multimarket competition with the acquirer, thereby diminishing the motivation for mutual 
forbearance. Thus, we expect that the rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary markets 
decreases mutual forbearance and increases the likelihood of an aggressive competitive response. 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Following an acquisition, the rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary 
markets is positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness. 
Resource similarity as awareness-enhancing and aggressiveness-motivating 
The similarity of the rival’s resources to those of the acquirer or its target may also affect the 
intensity of competitive rivalry following the acquisition (Chen, 1996). Some valuable resources 
and resource combinations may be attained only via acquisition of other firms. Consequently, 
threats to the resource balance among rivals via acquisitions can signal to rivals that the acquirer 
will be a more potent competitor, thereby heightening the level of competitive tension (Chen et 
al., 2007). For instance, acquisitions may allow the acquirer to overcome a competitive resource 
advantage held by a rival (Markman et al., 2009). More generally, with factor market rivalry, 
research suggests that acquisitions are particularly likely to result in an aggressive competitive 
response because they can allow acquirers access to the most valuable strategic resources, that is, 
resources that can produce a competitive advantage (Markman et al., 2009). 
These concerns may be particularly salient to the acquirer that expects private synergies from the 
acquisition. Private synergies are advantages created from the integration of resources of the 
merged firms that no other potential acquirers, including rivals, can expect to gain from the 
acquisition (Barney, 1988). Private synergies represent a special incentive, as they are price-
neutral. Rivals with resources similar to the acquirer will be particularly concerned about private 
synergies that can significantly change the existing resource balance among competitors. 
Additionally, only the acquirer will know how to bundle and leverage these resources gained in 
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the acquisition. Because rivals cannot adjust their resource portfolio in the same way as the 
acquirer, and accommodation of the acquirer will leave rivals with an enduring disadvantage 
(Capron and Chatain, 2008), rivals are likely to respond with a range of competitive actions, 
perhaps involving price reductions, new marketing campaigns, etc. In this case, an aggressive 
response might even distract the acquirer and delay the integration with the target so that 
potential private synergies are not quickly or fully realized. 
Furthermore, because many benefits from acquisitions are based on resource advantages (Hitt et 
al., 2001), rivals with resources similar to those of the acquirer are likely to have a clearer 
understanding of the acquisition’s potential resource advantages than rivals with less similar 
resources. Indeed, acquisitions provide acquirers with significant new resources, but the value of 
these resources is often difficult to realize because of the challenge to integrate the merging 
firms’ resources due to different cultures and operations. As such, it may be difficult for the 
acquirer to use the new resources effectively for new actions and to respond to rivals after the 
acquisition. A rival with high resource similarity vis-à-vis the acquirer and heightened awareness 
of the acquisition benefits, is likely more able to develop and implement an effective, aggressive 
competitive response to the acquisition. This rival should also have a better understanding of its 
potential competitive vulnerability in the marketplace because of the acquisition (Chen, 1996; 
Markman et al., 2009). The potential for efficiency in its competitive response may likewise 
motivate this rival to respond aggressively (Yu and Cannella, 2007). 
Prior research suggests that firms operating in the same market recognize their interdependence 
with close competitors and may limit behaviors that risk retaliation (Chen and Miller, 2012). 
However, research has shown that similarities between firms increase aggressive behaviors 
despite the potential for mutual forbearance (Gimeno and Woo, 1996). Moreover, similar 
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resource endowments between competitors have produced rapid competitive responses (Grimm 
et al., 2006). Presumably, this is because firms try to avoid becoming resource disadvantaged 
when a competitor attempts to gain an advantage over its rivals. These arguments suggest that 
resource similarity at the time of an acquisition increases the rival’s motivation to engage in an 
aggressive competitive response.  
HYPOTHESIS 2. Following an acquisition, the level of resource similarity between the 
acquirer and the rival is positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive 
aggressiveness. 
Slack as aggressiveness-enabling 
The rival’s capability to respond to a competitor’s acquisition is partly dependent on resources 
that are not fully employed prior to the acquisition. That is, the rival’s competitive responses 
often draw on its organizational slack. With few slack resources, the speed and scope of a rival’s 
repertoire of potential competitive responses will be more limited, increasing the likelihood of 
competitive acquiescence (Smith et al., 1991). Without slack resources, the rival may choose to 
accommodate an acquisition and gain at least some benefit by reducing competitive tension. 
Conversely, abundant organizational slack allows the rival to aggressively respond to a 
competitive challenge (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 2002; Smith et al., 1991; Young et al., 1996). 
Research shows that firms with slack resources often engage in bolder, more risky competitive 
actions (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). This is important because acquisitions are among the 
most visible, hard to reverse, and resource-intensive commitments that firms make (Hayward and 
Shimizu, 2006). Research also shows that actions with significant effects on the competitive 
context provoke a higher number of competitive responses by rivals (Chen et al., 1992). And, 
acquisitions often have a significant influence on the competitive context. Yet, aggressive 
responses to acquisitions involve high risk for the rival because they may threaten expected 
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returns to the acquisition which can provoke a major counter response from the acquirer. To 
reduce the risk of a countermove by the acquirer, rivals might accommodate an acquisition 
unless they have slack resources that allow for a bold, aggressive response. Only rivals with the 
strength (slack) to engage in quick, significant, and effective actions are confident that their 
aggressive responses will succeed; their slack enables adaptation in strategy if needed and further 
responses to countermoves by the acquirer (Smith et al., 1991; Wan and Yiu, 2009). 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Following an acquisition, the rival’s organizational slack is positively 
related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness. 
Moderation by acquisition relatedness 
Earlier, we indicated that different types of acquisitions have differential effects on rivals of the 
acquirer. While an acquisition of an unrelated target may provide the acquirer with very different 
resources, thus increasing the uncertainty of the acquisition outcomes, unrelated acquisitions 
produce entry into new industries thereby reducing market commonality between acquirer and 
rivals. Accordingly, a rival is less likely to react to a competitor’s unrelated acquisition. Related 
acquisitions, on the other hand, in particular horizontal ones, heighten the competitive tension 
between acquirer and rivals.  
In related acquisitions, acquirer, target, and rivals operate in similar markets.  Thus, rivals have a 
heightened awareness and the motivation to respond aggressively. On one hand, horizontal and 
related acquisition may lead to industry consolidation thereby reducing competitive pressures. 
Research has found that horizontal acquisitions result in reduced commitment of customers to 
the target firm (Berger et al., 1998), thereby creating growth opportunities for rivals. Yet, a 
related acquisition reduces a rival’s opportunities to engage in its own related acquisitions as it 
decreases the number of potential targets in the industry and can be likened to resource captivity 
(Markman et al., 2009). A rival with high dependence on the market in which a related 
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acquisition occurred might be particularly threatened by this move because it reduces its own 
range of options. Thus, this rival is likely to take other actions to exploit the reduced 
commitment of customers to the target firm and perhaps capture greater market share.  
Moreover, a related acquisition produces significant resource redeployment from the target to the 
acquirer (Capron et al., 1998), threatening the resource balance between the acquirer and rivals. 
An evenly matched competitor prior to the acquisition may now become a much more potent, 
capable competitor that threatens the market position of the rival thereby increasing competitive 
tension (Chen et al., 2007; Silverman and Baum, 2002). From the rival’s point of view, a related 
acquisition enables the acquirer to strengthen, for instance, product development, production 
facilities, and marketing capabilities that result in economies of scale and disadvantage the rival. 
As a result, the rival will seek different means to compete effectively. These arguments suggest 
that the type of acquisition moderates both the relationship between rivals’ dependence on 
markets common with the acquirer and acquirer-rival resource similarity and aggressive 
responses. However, the influence of the capability of rivals to respond (slack resources) is 
unlikely to be affected by acquisition relatedness. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. The positive relationships between (a) market dependence and (b) resource 
similarity with an increase in the level of rivals’ competitive aggressiveness, following and 
acquisition, is strengthened by the relatedness of the acquisition. 
Methods 
Sample 
We tested our hypotheses on a sample of firms that designated one of three related industries—
pharmaceutical preparations (SIC 2834), biological products (SIC 2836), or surgical and medical 
instruments and apparatus (SIC 3841)—as their primary line of business. These industries are 
characterized by precisely-defined boundaries, ensuring that competitive moves implemented by 
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industry members are designed to enhance a firm’s industry position relative to rivals. Market 
appraisals of pharmaceutical and med-tech firms often rely in large part on estimates of long-
term cash flows. Thus, companies widely announce competitive moves that are intended to boost 
future valuations. Further, the FDA approval process, the patenting process, and the marketing 
process (to doctors) in these industries are similar. Relative to other industry contexts, this allows 
us to more precisely observe the competitive moves by firms. Also, because R&D expenditures 
by these firms are substantial and products generated from them have blockbuster potential, 
competitive interaction is intense. Whereas, most competitive dynamics studies focus on a single 
industry, we extended our sampling over several adjacent industries to improve generalizability 
and because acquisitions often occur in related industries.  
For the firms in our sample, we captured all acquisitions carried out over an 18-year time frame 
(1995-2012) reported in the SDC M&A database. We also collected data on each rival’s 
competitive responses across a three-year window: The year that the acquisition was announced 
(year t) and the two years following (years t+1 and t+2). We limited the sample to acquisitions 
in which more than 50 percent of the target was acquired to ensure a controlling interest by the 
acquirer and not simply a diversifying investment in another autonomous firm. For access to the 
necessary data and including only those firms and acquisitions that are sufficient in size to be 
notable by rivals, we sampled acquisitions where target and acquiring firms were both listed on a 
U.S. stock market. This process yielded 422 acquisitions during our time frame by acquirers with 
their primary line of business in one of the three industries listed above. Not all targets were from 
these industries, and we control for the relationship between acquirer and target (see below). 
For each acquisition, we identified the top 10 rivals of the acquirer based on rivals’ total assets in 
the acquisition year. We used firm size as a criterion when selecting rivals because the largest 
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firms in an industry are more likely to view each other as direct competitors and often have their 
competitive actions more comprehensively and accurately reported in the media (Chen et al., 
2007; Ferrier et al., 1999). Further, because of the high barriers to entry in the industries 
studied—e.g., numerous patents, licensing agreements, lengthy FDA approval process, and steep 
R&D spending (Hindle, 2008)—smaller competitors are more specialized than their larger rivals 
and can likely overcome only selected barriers. To check for potential bias, we ran analyses with 
only reactions of the largest 5 competitors and there were no significant differences. 
We considered pharmaceutical and biotech companies to be rivals across several therapeutic 
domains and drug categories, so the top 10 rivals in both SIC codes were identified. We treated 
the surgical/medical instruments and apparatus industry as a separate set of competing firms 
from which we generated a separate list of top 10 rivals. However, there is sufficient evidence 
that firms in this industry have resources in common with, are subject to similar barriers to entry, 
and are often in multimarket competition with firms in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries. 
Financial data were collected on all acquirers, targets, and their rivals from COMPUSTAT. 
Identification and coding of rivals’ competitive actions 
Using structured content analysis of published news reports and press releases, scholars in 
competitive dynamics have developed a systematic procedure to retrieve and code news about a 
firm’s competitive moves into different action categories (Smith et al., 2001). Consistent with 
this approach, we used Factiva as the news source and conducted a comprehensive search for all 
published news reports associated with each firm in our sample over the study time period. 
This yielded thousands of news reports that served as the basis for identifying potential 
competitive actions. We applied a set of keywords associated with six different types of 
competitive actions—pricing, marketing, new products, capacity increases, legal proceedings, 
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and overt signaling—examined in prior multi-industry studies to establish our initial set of 
competitive actions (Ferrier 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). Then, following the example of prior 
research, we recalibrated the set of action categories to reflect some elements of competitive 
behavior unique to the pharmaceutical and med-tech industries.5 We added four action types 
to the initial set of actions: product improvements, promotional campaigns, clinical trials, and 
licensing agreements. An example news headline associated with a clinical trials action is: 
Bristol-Myers, Liposome Begin Phase II Testing of ABLC Drug. An example of a promotional 
action is Eli Lilly to Donate Drugs to Battle Tuberculosis Crisis in Russia. An example of a 
pricing action is Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on about 50 of its injectable anesthetics 
and intravenous products. Examples and the keyword coding scheme are presented in Table 1.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Drawing from announcements of M&As in the SDC database, we also captured acquisition 
events as an action category. In addition, we captured and coded two actions typically viewed in 
the M&A literature as accommodating to the acquirer: price increases and capacity reductions. 
The incidents of both were rare in the industries sampled. They were coded separately and 
included in our analyses as control variables for years t, t+1, and t+2. To ensure the reliability of 
our coding procedure, two experts in strategic management independently coded a representative 
sample (n=300) of news headlines into one of the aforementioned action categories. Using 
Perrault and Lee’s (1989) index of reliability, this categorization approach yielded a reliability 
index of 0.90, which exceeds the convention of 0.70 (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
Dependent variable 
We measured competitive aggressiveness with two dimensions. The first—competitive action 
volume—captures the number of rival competitive actions carried out in a given year, and has 
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received robust support as a measure of this construct (cf., Ferrier et al., 1999; Gnyawali et al., 
2006; Miller and Chen, 1996; Rindova et al., 2010; Young et al., 1996). Our second dimension—
competitive action complexity—is the extent to which the rival’s set of competitive actions taken 
in a given year consists of a broad range—as compared to a narrow range—of different action 
types. Here, we used a Herfindahl-type index that accounts for the weighted diversity among all 
action types (Ferrier et al., 1999; Ferrier, 2001). This index accounts for both the number of 
action categories and the degree of concentration—or dispersion—of actions across action 
categories. For example, a set of actions consisting mainly of marketing actions is considered a 
simple action repertoire. By contrast, a firm engaging in a set of competitive actions that exhibits 
a representative balance among the possible action types is more complex.  
Our data panel consists of measures for competitive action volume and competitive action 
complexity for each acquirer’s top ten rivals for three years during and following an acquisition. 
Yet, for our analyses, we used the change in a rival’s volume and complexity scores one and two 
years following an acquisition event. For example, a rival’s change in action volume is 
represented as action volume in year t+1 minus action volume in year t, and so on. This enabled 
us to capture increasing or decreasing levels of competitive aggressiveness in our analyses.  
Independent variables 
Market dependence. Similar to Gimeno’s (1999) approach, we calculated market dependence as 
the percentage of the rival's sales derived in the primary SIC code of the acquirer relative to the 
rival’s total revenue. High scores indicate higher dependence on the focal market. The data were 
obtained for the year prior to the acquisition from the COMPUSTAT segments database. 
Resource similarity. Consistent with prior studies in competitive dynamics, we calculate our 
measure of resource similarity between rival and acquirer for every acquisition. These studies 
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use a Euclidean distance measure across several dimensions, pairwise with the rival and acquirer 
(Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Upson et al., 2012; Young et al., 2000). The variables chosen to 
compare resources ideally are both generalizable to other industries but also reflect salient 
resource positions particular to the industry studied. We selected four dimensions to include in 
our composite score for resource similarity. First, firm size, measured as total assets, is a 
powerful explanatory variable that reflects strategic capabilities, product-market strategies, and 
network strength (Josefy et al., 2015; Gimeno and Woo, 1996). Second, technological intensity, 
measured as the percentage of R&D spending divided by revenue, is particularly important in the 
pharmaceutical, biotech, and med-tech industries because of the risks and rewards associated 
with the new innovative treatments developed, and the extent to which firms choose to invest in 
innovative capabilities (Das and Teng, 1998). Third, marketing and advertising intensity, 
measured by the marketing budget divided by revenue, indicates the capabilities of the firms to 
push their products to their customer base, a dimension with wide variance in the focal 
industries. Finally, market-specific experience, measured as the number of years each firm has 
operated in the primary SIC code of the acquirer, captures the industry specific human capital 
and experience imprinted within the firm (Barney, 1991; Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Gimeno 
and Woo, 1996). The similarity score was calculated consistent with Gimeno and Woo (1996), 
for dimension d with rival r and acquirer a for acquisition q over the set of the four dimensions 
described above, s1 –s4. We subtracted the resultant resource distance score from 1 so that higher 
scores indicate resource similarity, as opposed to resource distance. 
 Similarityraq = 1 –       ∑ (drs – das)2 
S=1 
4 
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We also tested the effects of alternative combinations of these resource dimensions, as well as 
individual elements of our composite score. These efforts yielded substantively similar results. 
Yet, we included the composite measure with the four aforementioned dimensions because of its 
robust representation of resource similarity in our respective industries and because of its 
discriminant validity relative to our control variables. 
Organizational slack. To measure the level of resources available for a rival to use in responding 
to a competitor’s actions, we calculated organizational slack as the ratio of working capital to 
sales (Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Chakravarthy, 1986; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988). An 
alternative measure of slack, SGA to sales, produced essentially identical results. 
Relatedness. We measured the moderating variable employing a 3 point scale- 0=unrelated 
(same 2 digit SIC code or less), 1=related-diversified (same 3 digit SIC code), and 2=horizontal 
(same 4 digit SIC code). 
Control variables. Because size significantly influences firm actions, we controlled for the size 
of the acquirer (Josefy et al., 2015). We used the log of total sales as a measure of acquirer size. 
Small acquisitions are likely to produce fewer responses by the rivals, so we controlled for 
acquisition size as the log of the dollar value of the transaction. Given the close relationship 
between size and slack, we controlled for rival size (the log of total assets) in order to identify 
the effect of slack on the implementation of actions. Because there may be different industry-
specific reasons for acquisitions, we controlled for industry at the four-digit SIC code level of the 
acquirer with dummy variables. 
Financial constraints impact competitive actions. Thus we controlled for capital and advertising 
intensity, which are substantial in the pharmaceutical industry, and research shows them to be 
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important for complexity (Hughes-Morgan et al., 2010; Andrevski et al, in press). We measured 
capital intensity as the rival’s net fixed assets to total book assets, and advertising intensity as the 
rival’s advertising spending to total sales in the year prior to the acquisition. 
Further, we controlled for several variables that indicate the ability of the acquirer to effectively 
integrate the new entity as it could prompt rivals to respond in a more aggressive manner. As 
greater acquisition experience can ease acquisition integration, we controlled for the previous 
acquisition experience of the acquirer using the count of acquisitions by the acquirer over the last 
ten years (Barkema and Schijven, 2008). As this attribute of the rival might influence its 
competitive aggressiveness we also controlled for the acquisition experience of the rival as the 
count of acquisitions over the last ten years. We controlled for pre-acquisition performance of 
the acquirer, measured as the return on equity for the year prior to the acquisition because prior 
firm performance may affect the ability to integrate the acquisition. We controlled for target 
performance as well, using the return on equity for the year prior to the acquisition. We 
controlled for pre-acquisition performance of the rival, measured as the return on equity for the 
year prior to the acquisition because this may affect the ability of the rival to respond. 
Because the focal acquisition might be a response to a previous acquisition by a rival, we 
controlled for the time since the last acquisition in the industry (time since last acq.). Also, 
because several firms appear among the top 10 rivals in numerous acquisition cases and thus 
might respond extraordinarily aggressively, we control for this possibility with the number of 
times a firm appeared as one of the top 10 rivals to an acquirer (rival appearances). Due to 
difference in performance levels across the three industries that may affect the capability of firms 
to respond, we controlled for average industry performance for the three years after the 
acquisition (Ellis et al., 2011). As mentioned earlier, we controlled for rival accommodating 
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actions, such as price increases and capacity reductions. We initially controlled for previous 
alliances between acquirer and target, but found only few such cases in the SDC JV database 
with no effect, so this variable was omitted from later analyses. 
Analysis and results 
The unit of analysis for our study is the rival firm. Our data are structured such that each 
acquisition event corresponds to the competitive aggressiveness variables (action volume and 
action complexity) and organizational attributes (e.g., rival size, rival performance) of the top 10 
rivals. This gives rise to repeated occurrences of acquirer attributes in the analyses. To account 
for this, we used generalized estimating equations (GEE) with the acquisition as the subject 
variable and each rival’s competitive actions as the within-subject variables. GEE uses weighted 
combinations of observations to extract the appropriate amount of information from correlated 
data (Hanley et al., 2003). For model-fit statistics, we use the quasi-likelihood-based model-
selection criterion (QIC) of the full model and compare it with the QIC statistic for the base 
model that includes only the controls. We found that adding the independent variables improves 
fit in models with significant results (Pan, 2001). Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
are reported in Table 2. Results of the GEE regression analyses are reported in Table 3. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that a rival’s dependence on the acquirer’s primary market would be 
positively related to an increase in the rival’s competitive aggressiveness. Our analysis indeed 
finds that market dependence of a rival is a positive and statistically significant predictor of its 
change in competitive action volume in both year one and year two following the acquisition. 
This indicates that when rivals are reliant on the markets in which a competitor makes an 
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acquisition, they evidently responded quickly with an increase in the number of competitive 
moves, and continue this aggressiveness in the second year. There was no statistically significant 
relationship with competitive action complexity. Thus, the results provide moderate support for 
Hypothesis 1 with a greater number of competitive actions. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that resource similarity between the acquirer and rivals would be 
positively related to an increase in the rival’s level of competitive aggressiveness. Our analysis 
finds that resource similarity of a rival is a positive and statistically significant predictor of its 
change in competitive action volume in both year one and year two following the acquisition. 
Thus, as for market dependence, rivals appeared to initially respond with an increase in the 
number of competitive moves and continue this aggressiveness in the second year. There was no 
statistically significant relationship with competitive action complexity. Thus, the results provide 
moderate support for Hypothesis 1 with a greater number of competitive actions. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that rivals’ organizational slack increases the likelihood they will engage 
in aggressive competitive responses subsequent to the merger undertaken by their competitor. As 
reported in Table 3, slack is a positive and statistically significant predictor of an increase in 
competitive action volume in the year immediately following the acquisition, however not in the 
second year. Slack is also positively and significantly associated with an increase in competitive 
action complexity in the second year following the acquisition, but not in the first. These results 
suggest that rivals’ level of slack increases their competitive responses in both the short and long 
term, with an immediate increase in the number of actions carried out, and a longer term increase 
in the variety of actions, providing support for hypothesis 3. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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Hypotheses 4a and 4b predicted that the relatedness of an acquisition would moderate the 
relationships between market dependence and aggressiveness, and resource similarity and 
aggressiveness, respectively. Based on the coefficient for the relatedness - market dependence 
interaction terms in Table 4, we find partial support for 4a, as related acquisitions moderate the 
relationship between market dependence and competitive action but only for response 
complexity in the second year.6 For ease of interpretation, we graphed interaction effects as 
shown in Figure 2. Specifically, the upward slope for the high relatedness condition is reflective 
of the predicted main effect (H1) between market dependence and year t+2 action repertoire 
complexity. Yet, in low relatedness acquisitions the slope of the market dependence–complexity 
relationship is negative. 
We find stronger support for hypothesis 4b, however. As shown in Table 5, the coefficients for 
the moderating effects are statistically significant for change in action complexity in both years 
subsequent to the acquisition. These interactions are depicted in Figure 3. Specifically, related 
acquisitions are associated with an increase in the positive slope of the resource similarity–
complexity relationship. Yet, in low relatedness acquisitions the slope of the resource similarity–
action complexity relationship is negative for both post-acquisition years. None of the 
interactions tested, however, affected the volume of rival responses.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 4-5; Figures 2-3 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Robustness test 
To test the robustness of our findings and demonstrate a direct link between an acquisition and 
aggressive rival reactions, we conducted an event study identifying stock market (i.e., investors’) 
assessments of firm actions (e.g., announcement of an acquisition). The intensity of rivalry is 
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critical for firm performance (Chen, 1996; Porter, 1980) and stock prices are affected by rival 
actions (Ferrier and Lee, 2002). Thus, investors likely take the probability of aggressive rival 
response to an acquisition into consideration when evaluating the value of the acquisition for the 
acquirer. Investors have access to information on rival awareness, motivation and capability to 
respond to a merger. Following the example of previous M&A studies (e.g., Haleblian et al., 
2009), we used event study methodology to identify the abnormal returns associated with the 
announcement of all acquisitions in our sample. We used the approach recommended by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) to measure the abnormal stock price returns of the firms. Using 
an estimation period preceding the event 250 to 50 days as recommended by McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997), we included the returns within a three-day window that includes the day of the 
acquisition as well as the day before and after. Subsequently, we used the abnormal returns as the 
dependent variable in our GEE regression analysis instead of the rivals’ reactions. 
We found that investors’ reactions were largely consistent with our findings: the results suggest 
that investors expect rivals to respond to an acquisition given market dependence, reducing the 
expected returns to the acquisition. That is, market dependence was associated negatively with 
abnormal returns to merger. We found the same result for rival slack. However, results for 
resource similarity were not statistically significant. Investors seem less concerned with resource 
similarity as a driver of aggressive competitive reaction to acquisition. Findings related to the 
moderating effects, however, demonstrated that those investors were concerned about the 
resource similarity with a related acquisition. The results for the interaction involving market 
dependence were not a statistically significant predictor of market returns. These findings 
indicate support for the robustness of the findings related to our hypotheses. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
To understand weak returns to mergers, research largely focused on a cost-benefit analysis 
limited to conditions internal to the merger and the merging firms, such as takeover premiums 
and high integration costs. Research also suggests that mergers can create synergies based on 
complementary resources, economies of scale and scope, and other benefits that help achieve or 
maintain a competitive advantage. Yet, most of this work assumes a static competitive landscape, 
although they are dynamic, and shifts are often driven by acquisitions. Without an understanding 
of the external competitive context, we limit our power to explain the outcomes of M&As. 
Given the potential competitive strengths an acquirer can gain from an acquisition, rivals can be 
expected to engage in aggressive competitive responses (actions) that limit or eliminate these 
anticipated advantages. Some research finds that rivals may accommodate mergers because they 
could receive peripheral benefits due to industry consolidation. But, competitive dynamics 
theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that rivals can also be threatened or harmed by 
competitors’ acquisitions. This study has highlighted conditions under which rivals appear to 
react aggressively to an acquisition, in contrast to prevailing theory in finance and economics. 
Based on research in competitive dynamics, we found that under certain conditions related to 
rivals’ awareness and motivation—estimated by market dependence of rivals common with 
acquirers and resource similarity within the rival-acquirer dyad—, and rivals’ capability—
estimated by their organizational slack—, they increase the number of competitive actions 
carried out subsequent to a competitor’s merger or acquisition. This increase in total actions is 
often sustained for somewhat longer periods. These findings complement those from prior 
research about the role of market dependence and resource similarity in competitive responses 
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(e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Chen et al., 2007; Yu and Cannella, 2007). 
Moreover, when rivals have organizational slack, they may even respond with a broader 
repertoire of actions. This, however, is observed only in the second year following the 
acquisition which suggests that it takes time to decide on, develop, and carry out a 
comprehensive counter-attack. Our general findings suggest that future research should examine 
acquisitions as a strategic action within a dynamic, competitive environment.  
Further, our findings suggest that the complexity of rival responses based on resource similarity 
(and to a lesser degree based on market dependence) is influenced by the relatedness of the 
acquisition. Seemingly firms that perceive an increase in competitive tension from a competitor’s 
acquisition are incentivized to react with a more complex response repertoire when the 
acquisition is related and thus creates an additional, more immediate threat to the rival. Likewise, 
less related mergers appear to reduce competitive tension making resource similarity less 
important. Previous findings showing accommodative behavior by rivals focused on industries in 
which horizontal (i.e., highly related) acquisitions are more common (e.g., commercial airlines). 
Potentially, accommodation through prices increases subsequent to merger may help fund other 
types of aggressive behavior, such as marketing or product actions. Alternatively, differences 
between industries may explain the extent to which industry-consolidating acquisitions are 
accommodated or aggressively contested—a question ripe for future research. 
Viewed through the lens of competitive dynamics, our study contradicts many previous findings 
suggesting that rivals generally accommodate M&As. On a broader level, our research indicates 
that collusive behavior anticipated with acquisitions (Chatterjee, 1986; Kim and Singal, 1993) 
may result from the lack of awareness, motivation, and/or ability of rivals to react. Under 
conditions where rivals have significant resources to respond to a competitor’s acquisition, or 
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when rivals consider an acquisition to be a threat to their market position, they are unlikely to 
accommodate a competitor’s acquisitive actions; instead, they respond with a heightened number 
of actions, perhaps with greater breadth and complexity. These rival responses contribute to our 
understanding of acquirers achieving approximately zero or only small positive returns from 
acquisitions (Song and Walking, 2000). The inconsistent results from prior research regarding 
the effect of acquisitions on competitive pressures in industries may be resolved with a richer 
understanding of acquiring firms’ and rivals’ characteristics, and the competitive landscape in 
which they operate. Accordingly, our study provides a foundation for the previously 
underexplored external context of M&As (Haleblian et al., 2009; Wan and Yiu, 2009). 
Our research extends our understanding of competitive dynamics by exploring new drivers of 
competitive behavior (Chen and Miller, 2012; Smith et al., 2001). In general, our findings 
provide additional support for the AMC framework and highlight the value and generalizability 
of insights gained by work in competitive dynamics to the domain of corporate strategic actions. 
Although some of our findings mirror those from some prior research that adopted the action-
response dyad level of action aggregation (e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992), we found that by 
adopting a hybrid action-repertoire view of competitive response—a single competitive action 
provokes a competitive repertoire response—our results partially contradict findings from other 
extant research. This demonstrates the value of exploring a repertoire complexity response to 
competitive actions. Further, whereas prior research has explored the relationships among a 
variety of organizational, managerial, competitive, and industry attributes and competitive 
repertoires (Gnyawali et al., 2006; Miller and Chen, 1994; 1996), our study is among the first to 
explore these effects over time. Indeed, we found differential effects between the organizational 
and competitive context variables in our models on action volume versus complexity over time. 
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Moreover, the influence of acquisition relatedness suggests a critical contextual condition for the 
responses to this unique competitive action. It also lends early empirical support to recent theory 
associated with factor market rivalry (Markman et al., 2009). 
Our research suggests that corporate-level strategy research needs to inculcate competitive 
rivalry similar to scholarly work on business-level strategy. We show that the two levels are not 
independent; rather, they appear to be interdependent, an important result for understanding the 
strategic outcomes. Aggressive business-level competitive actions may well be provoked by 
corporate-level actions of competitors. This supports our understanding of factor market rivalry 
suggesting that factor market actions, such as acquisitions, may exacerbate product market 
rivalry (Markman et al., 2009). Conversely, a competitive dynamics perspective of M&As could 
be extended by taking into account the product level. In addition to competing on the business 
and corporate level, pharmaceutical firms also compete on specific drugs, e.g., Pfizer’s Lipitor 
against other cholesterol-reducing treatments. Therefore, rivals may respond to acquisitions in 
market segments in which they compete, as well as at the industry level. Our research 
specifically extends the emerging theoretical framework of competitive dynamics into a new, 
important strategic context, M&As, broadening the support for the AMC framework (Chen, 
1996; Chen et al., 2007), and provides evidence on the implications of factor market rivalry 
(Markman et al., 2009; Chatain and Capron, 2008). 
Our study also has significant implications for managerial practice. Previous research found 
accommodation as typical rival response to acquisitions. However, our research suggests rivals 
may react aggressively, depending on rivals’ awareness, motivation and capability to do so. 
Investors are also aware of this additional risk associated with acquisitions. Acquiring firm 
managers should be cognizant of the potential for rivals to react aggressively, even with the 
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complex internal challenges typically present in executing M&As. Further, managers might 
consider signaling to rivals that a specific acquisition is not an aggressive strategic move, but 
creates opportunities to reduce the level of competition within their industry, in order to prompt 
accommodating rather than aggressive rival responses (Chen and Miller, 1994). 
Limitations 
Although our study includes a broader set of industries than Kim and Singal’s (1993), our 
research is still limited to a set of related industries. Certainly, our results suggest that the Kim 
and Singal (1993) findings may be idiosyncratic to the airline industry or may stem from 
industry-wide characteristics typical of transportation industries that are not representative of the 
medical (and related) industries. Future research could fruitfully explore how industry attributes 
(via multi-industry studies) impact the aggressiveness of competitive reactions to M&As and 
consolidation is warranted. Multi-industry studies could also better examine rival reactions to 
diversifying acquisitions. 
Our study also was unable to determine with certainty the intentionality of rival actions or if the 
focal acquisition actually was a response to a previous action by a rival. We attempted to 
minimize this concern by (a) using the change in rival actions, including change in competitive 
action repertoire, in years subsequent to the acquisition relative to pre-acquisition actions rather 
than absolute values as our dependent variables; by (b) limiting our sample to large firms that are 
unambiguously direct rivals with each other; by (c)  using an event study as a robustness test that 
more tightly links rival responses with a specific acquisition event; and by (d) controlling for the 
time since the last acquisition in the industry before the focal one. In addition, the significant 
findings for hypothesis 4 are an indication that the rival actions indeed are associated with the 
acquisition; otherwise the main effects we found would not have been modified by the 
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acquisition relatedness. Nevertheless, more direct measures need to be developed for research on 
acquisitions and competitive dynamics surrounding them. Measurement issues might also 
contribute to weaker than expected findings for some of our main effects. For instance, with 
respect to the measurement of resource similarity, future research might take into consideration 
additional resource attributes, such as their mobility and versatility (Markman et al., 2009). 
In conclusion, our findings indicate that further development of theory on the returns to M&As is 
needed. For instance, research could examine the link between competitive responses to an 
acquisition and post-merger performance of the acquirer. Further, the competitive environment 
of acquirers should be considered. While we have identified some conditions that can increase 
the likelihood of aggressive competitive response to acquisitions, further work should examine 
additional motives and identify the abilities of rivals to undertake effective responses to 
competitors’ acquisitions. For instance, scholars might consider additional industry conditions. 
In industries with short product life cycles, firms have limited time to recoup investments and 
competitive disadvantages must be eradicated rapidly to avoid major financial losses. An 
acquisition resulting in a significant advantage for the merged firm may lead to significantly 
higher returns, likely at the expense of rivals with little time to offset the consequences. Thus, in 
these markets, competitive advantage is rarely sustainable (Hitt et al., 2011). Because the 
consequences are of immediate significance to rivals in these fast-cycle markets, acquisitions are 
likely to produce swift and strong competitive responses. Taken together, this study adds new 
evidence to help us understand the returns experienced from acquisitions and advocates a new 
stream of research integrating scholarly work on M&As with research on competitive dynamics. 
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1 Several studies examined the effect of M&A activity on rivals’ stock returns (Eckbo, 1983; 
Song and Walking, 2000). While this work revealed some positive effects, findings were 
interpreted as not resulting from collusive, anticompetitive behavior, but instead as an 
information/signaling effect whereby rivals of acquisition targets are considered more likely to 
become takeover targets themselves. Alternatively, Gaur, Malhotra, and Zhu (2013) observed 
that acquisitions in China indicate industry growth potential. Both effects may boost rivals’ stock 
returns. 
2 Here, we use the term level of action aggregation to distinguish it from level of analysis. It 
simply refers to a variety of constructs and associated measures reflective of different ways 
competitive actions are grouped together (Smith et al., 1991; Chen and Miller, 2012). 
3 Here, we deliberately introduce the term rival to delineate which focal firm—among all other 
rival firms to the acquiring firm—has responded to the acquisition events in our analyses. 
4 Competitive actions of different types vary in terms of important attributes: Strategic (vs. 
tactical), magnitude, scope, noteworthiness, visibility, implementation requirement, and 
irreversibility (Smith et al., 2001). Prior research suggests that these properties impact the 
likelihood, speed, and type of response (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Smith et 
al., 1991). Based on this logic, we argue that acquisitions (as a type of competitive action not 
previously studied) are likely to exhibit all these properties and, consequently, are likely to 
influence rival competitive aggressiveness. 
5 Early research in competitive dynamics focused on airline industry-specific types of 
competitive actions (e.g., Miller & Chen, 1994). More recent research developed and tested 
reliable sets of action types specific to, for example, the steel industry (Gnyawali et al., 2006), 
computer software (Young et al., 1996), the automotive industry (Yu and Cannella, 2007), and 
the internet industry (Rindova et al., 2010). Other studies developed a set of actions carried out 
in a range of different industries (Ferrier et al., 1999). 
6 Due to multicollinearity concerns we analyzed the effects of the relatedness x market 
dependence and relatedness x resource similarity interactions in separate regression models. 
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Figure 1. Drivers of rival response aggressiveness 
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Figure 2. Effects on rival aggressiveness of the interaction of market dependence and relatedness 
of acquisition 
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Figure 3 a, b. Effects on rival aggressiveness of the interaction of resource similarity and type of 
acquisition 
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Table 1. Action types coding keywords and example headlines 
 
Action type Content analysis coding scheme  Examples of headlines from news reports 
Pricing  
Keywords: price cut discount change 
(those raising prices were excluded) 
 ‘Abbott Laboratories has lowered prices on 
about 50 of its drugs (mostly injectable 
anesthetics and intravenous products).’ 
Marketing  
Keywords: advertise commercial 
television campaign spot 
 ‘Interneuron Pharmaceuticals announces 
alliance with American Cyanamid to market 
anti-obesity product’ 
New Products  
Keywords: introduce launch unveil roll out 
approve 
 
 ‘Haemonetics Launches New Mobile Plasma 
Collection Technology in Japan’ 
Capacity 
Increases 
Keywords: raises boosts increase expand 
(those reducing capacity were excluded) 
 ‘Alpharma Reaches Agreement to Expand 
Vancomycin Capacity’ 
 
Legal 
Proceedings 
Keywords: sue litigate settle infringement 
 
 ‘Allergan Sues Santen Pharmaceutical Alleges 
Rights Infringement’ 
Signaling  Keywords: vows promises says seeks aims  ‘Elan restructuring aims to please market.’ 
Product 
Improvements  
Keywords: improve enhance update 
change 
 ‘Systematic Tooling Analysis Improves 
Warner-Lambert Product Transfer’ 
Promotion  Keywords: donate contest 
sponsor promote 
 ‘Eli Lilly To Donate Drugs To Battle 
Tuberculosis Crisis In Russia’ 
Clinical trial  Keywords: phase clinical trial  ‘Bristol-Myers Liposome Begin Phase II 
Testing Of ABLC Drug’ 
Licensing  Keywords: license contract   ‘Boston Scientific to License Its Ultrasound 
Technology’ 
Acquisitions  From SDC database   
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Table 2.  Correlations and descriptive statistics   
Mean
Std. 
Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
1. Acquirer Size 4.21 1.28
2. Acquisition Size 1.82 1.06  .100**
3. Rival Size 4.36 .814  .031*  .003
4. Advertising Intensity 0.12 0.34 -.113** -.030* -.008
5. Capital Intensity 0.05 0.02  .153** -.008  .029 -.230**
6. Relatedness 0.92 0.65  .067**  .166**  .050** -.009 -.006
7. Previous Acq. Experience 20.97 17.15 -.135** -.057** -.036*  .001  .004 -.199**
8. Rival Experience 29.51 19.41 -.118**  .135** -.040 -.035* -.084**  .022  .194**
9. Time Since Last Acq. 4.12 0.89  .050**  .017 -.025  .013  .006 -.047**  .097**   .181**
10. Rival # of Appearances 327.23 64.39  .134** -.011  .044**  .035*  .018 -.042** -.038*  -.007  .078**
11. Pre-Acq. Performance 0.05 0.26 -.003  .200** -.130** -.009  .001  .180**  .336**   .482** -.099**  .210**
12. Target Performance 0.03 0.01 -.108** -.121** -.030*  .011 -.005 -.022  .056**  -.056*  .023 -.026  .011
13. Industry Performance 0.07 0.12  .159**  .132** -.018 -.006  .029 -.063**  .034*   .227** -.010 -.004  .260** -.003
14. Rival Performance 0.06 0.17 -.007  .001  .042*  .048**  .091**  .001  .002  -.016  .001 -.012  .021  .001  .001
15. Accomodating Actions 0.28 0.52  .007 -.006 -.007 -.025  .023 -.004  .001   .002 -.012  .002  .006  .021 -.010 -.006
16. Market Dependence 0.57 0.45 -.031* -.047**  .049** -.034*  .004  .209**  .160**   .188** -.004 -.067** -.121** -.020 -.041*  .038*  .033*
17. Resource Similarity 0.56 0.54  .127**  .079** -.006 -.022 -.010  .032*  .026  -.266**  .060**  .083**  .006 -.020  .057** -.018 -.002 -.073**
18. Organizational Slack 0.25 0.18 -.038**  .006 -.012  .098** -.125** -.009  .007   .008 -.001 -.032*  .016  .021  .005  .014 -.013 -.045**  .022
19. Change in Volume t+1 1.25 12.65  .021  .018 -.008 -.009  .012  .009  .014   .062  .024 -.016 -.053*  .005 -.030* -.019  .029*  .029*  .042**  .112**
20. Change in Volume t+2 0.52 10.63 -.005 -.013  .021  .002  .022  .014  .028  -.103 -.014 -.013 -.029 -.016  .006 -.018  .016  .012  .020  .038**  .028
21. Change in Complexity t+1 0.02 0.16  .005  .003 -.009  .012 -.039*  .023 -.040*  -.040  .027  .028  .037  .018  .003 -.033*  .028  .004  .008 -.037* -.037*  .003
22. Change in Complexity t+2 0.02 0.14 -.006  .010  .018  .033*  .001 -.005  .005  -.011  .001 -.036*  .001 -.001 -.018 -.016 -.006  .021 -.022  .028  .023  .140** -.088**  
* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.  Regression analysis – main effects† 
 
Variables  Change in Competitive Action Volume   Change in Competitive Action Complexity  
  t+1  t+2   t+1   t+2  
  Coeff  SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE  
GEE Model         
Acquirer Size -1.106 1.036 -.337 .848 .009 .016 .011 .022 
Acquisition Size .838 .783  1.256* .750 -.006 .007 -.005 .006 
Rival Size -1.090* .629 -.752 .814 -.005 .009 .007 .009 
Advertising Intensity -2.581 1.685 -.049 1.899 .050 .052    .057** .018 
Capital Intensity  32.310 23.099  38.106* 20.320 .020 .426  1.061* .473 
Relatedness .533 .752 1.312 1.191  .004 .007      .014** .005 
Previous Acq. Experience .208 .483 -.099 .544 -.008 .006 .003 .005 
Rival Experience -1.315 1.129 .301 1.127  -. 022* .009 .001 .006 
Time Since Last Acq. -4.088 5.362 4.132 6.872  .072* .037  -.077* .038 
Rival Appearances .599 2.756 -1.475 1.597 -.001 .022  -.050* .024 
Pre-Acq. Performance 5.916 4.390 -4.456 6.144  -.080* .035 .037 .035 
Target Performance -5.546 4.459 -4.032 5.758 .022 .030 -.017 .040 
Industry Performance 5.072 12.629 4.602 12.100    .185** .067 .015 .078 
Rival Performance -10.862 7.160 -1.754 6.153 -.036 .060 -.026 .059 
Accommodating Actions -.630 .845 -.139 .750 -.001 .011 .005 .009 
Market Dependence   4.308** 1.568  2.864* 1.480 .020 .018 .014 .012 
Resource Similarity 2.877* 1.434  1.897* .927 .010 .013 .001 .013 
Organizational Slack    8.619** 3.445 1.553 2.493 -.035 .046  .096* .037 
QIC base model 1169.072  908.412  59.687  64.677  
QIC full model 1036.352  872.345  53.223  44.836  
n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
 
† results for industry dummies omitted 
   one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses 
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Table 4.  Regression analysis – moderation market dependence x acquisition relatedness† 
 
n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
 
† results for industry dummies omitted 
   one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses 
 
Variables  Change in Competitive Action Volume   Change in Competitive Action Complexity  
  t+1  t+2   t+1   t+2  
  Coeff  SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE  
GEE Model         
Acquirer Size  .948 1.025   .303 .856 .009 .016 .010 .022 
Acquisition Size .714 .837 1.233 .743 -.006 .007 -.007 .004 
Rival Size -.717 .664 -.684 .815 -.005 .009 .011 .010 
Advertising Intensity   -3.128* 1.710 -.145 1.877 .050 .053     .051** .019 
Capital Intensity 25.096 23.497 36.758 23.073 .020 .428  .967* .472 
Relatedness .882 .759 1.375 1.210 -.012 .008 .032 .033 
Previous Experience -.157 .540 -.165 .571 -.008 .006 -.001 .005 
Rival Experience -1.272 1.127 .310 1.121  .022* .010 .001 .006 
Time Since Last Acq. -4.911 5.367 3.990 6.860  .072* .037  -.085* .038 
Rival Appearances .155 2.686 -1.574 1.618 -.001 .022   -.058** .024 
Prior Performance 4.439 4.954 -4.715 6.190  -.080* .035 .025 .034 
Target Performance  6.118 4.660 -4.122 5.734 .022 .030 -.019 .039 
Industry Performance 8.186 12.405 5.162 11.979     .186** .069 .043 .078 
Rival Performance -11.690* 7.100 -1.901 6.157 -.036 .060 -.036 .057 
Accommodating Actions -.594 .835 -.133 .748 -.001 .011 .006 .009 
Market Dependence   3.650** 1.5672  2.743* 1.504 .020 .018   .022* .021 
Resource Similarity  2.951* 1.455   1.915* .919 .010 .013 .002 .013 
Organizational Slack    8.188**  3.380 1.479 2.483 -.035 .045 .069 .050 
Relatedness x Market 
Dependence 
-3.338 4.663 -2.412 4.180  .001 .039       .064*** .014 
QIC base model 1036.352  872.345  53.223  44.836  
QIC full model 1041.221  842.874  48.822  38.085  
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Table 5.  Regression analysis – moderation resource similarity x relatedness † 
 
Variables  Change in Competitive Action Volume   Change in Competitive Action Complexity  
  t+1  t+2   t+1   t+2  
  Coeff  SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE   Coeff   SE  
GEE Model         
Acquirer Size -1.103 1.037 -.339 .848 .009 .016 .011 .022 
Acquisition Size .861 .793 1.235* .752 -.006 .007 -.007 .005 
Rival Size -1.099* .632 -.744 .814 -.005 .009 .008 .009 
Advertising Intensity -2.575 1.685 -.054 1.899 .049 .052     .056** .018 
Capital Intensity 32.245 23.104 38.158 23.323 .019 .426    .062* .032 
Relatedness .516 .760 1.329 1.197  .070 .080   .100* .064 
Previous Acq. Experience .216 .486 -.106 .546 -.008 .006 .002 .005 
Rival Experience -1.329 1.138 .313 1.129   .022* .009  .002 .006 
Time Since Last Acq. -4.064 5.369 4.111 6.869   .072* .037   -.078* .037 
Rival Appearances .630 2.772 -1.507 1.606 -.002 .022 - .054* .025 
Pre-Acq. Performance 5.899 4.379 -4.440 6.143  -.080* .035 .038 .034 
Target Performance -5.606 4.460 -3.974 5.753 .023 .030 -.012 .039 
Industry Performance 5.055 12.627 4.617 12.074     .186** .067 .016 .076 
Rival Performance -10.810 7.171 -1.801 6.155 -.037 .060 -.031 .059 
Accommodating Actions -.625 .845 -.143 .749 -.001 .011 .005 .009 
Market Dependence      4.305** 1.569 2.866* 1.483 .020 .018 .014 .012 
Resource Similarity   2.834* 1.424 1.937* .918 .011 .013 .009 .018 
Organizational Slack   8.608* 3.449 1.563 2.492 -.035 .046 .068 .050 
Relatedness x Resource 
Similarity 
-2.604 2.973 2.379 2.506   .047* .025       .150*** .020 
QIC base model 1036.352  872.345  53.223  44.836  
QIC full model 1056.578  852.612  42.782  32.047  
n = 4220 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001 
 
† results for industry dummies omitted 
   one-tailed tests per directional hypotheses 
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